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The social policy agenda of the Great Society was shaped by the recognition that if broad
social improvement was to be achieved in urban America, social planning and state
intervention based on systemically acquired expertise about the city would have to be
developed. As a case study in the development of such expertise, in this thesis I explore
the work of the Urban Systems Laboratory (USL), established in 1968 at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) with funding from the Ford Foundation.
Using computationally intensive methods, behavioral models and the latest techniques of
the information sciences, research at the USL emphasized the role of rational, analytical,
social scientific expertise in managing social conflict. In particular, I explore the work of
Jay W. Forrester, a member of the USL whose research on the city was published in 1969
as Urban Dynamics. Using an IBM Systems/360 Model 67, Forrester built one of the first
large-scale, interactive, computational models of a city specifically to explore the
consequences of the social policies of the period and more generally the possibility of the
social engineering of complex social systems in a postindustrial society. This project of
the production of expertise at the USL struggled to secure legitimacy in the early 1970s
as the attempt to treat the problems of urban America as phenomena to be handled by a
new class of experts was overwhelmed by the sheer scale of urban turmoil.
Thesis Supervisor: Caroline A. Jones
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Chapter 1:
The Great Society and the Urban Crisis
Too often regarded as separate, the processes of postwar suburbanization were in fact
deeply interrelated with those that shaped postwar urban America, including the
concentration of poor African Americans in central cities, deindustrialization,
disinvestment, and rapid depopulation.' From this perspective, these processes can be
seen as a single process that produced the geography of the postwar United States. This
process produced a period of prosperity for two decades following World War II.
However, in the mid-1960s this process began to undermine the stability of American
2
society. The largest effort of social reform since the New Deal was designed to resolve
many of the most severe social problems of urban America-primarily those surrounding
the issues of poverty-and thus arrest the consequences of uneven postwar development.
As President Lyndon B. Johnson stated in 1965, this massive expansion of the state was,
in effect, "part of an effort to build the great cities which are at the foundation of our
hopes for a Great Society."3 Rarely recognized as such, the Great Society was the most
extensive urban development program in the history of the United States.
The power of the state would reach deeply into urban America for the rest of the
decade to respond to the most widespread social threat since the Great Depression. This
' Jon C. Teaford, The Metropolitan Revolution: The Rise of Post-Urban America (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2006).
2 Robert A. Beauregard, When America Became Suburban (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
2006), 40-69.
3 Lyndon B. Johnson, "Special Message to the Congress on the Nation's Cities, March 2, 1965," in Public
Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Vol. 1 (Washington: United States
Government Printing Office, 1965), 240.
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threat was known as "the urban crisis." 4 The urban crisis was primarily a source of fear.
Indeed, as Robert A. Beauregard has argued, this period saw "the emergence of a single
theme that... turned urban decline into a society wide problem. The theme was race, the
problem was the concentration, misery, and rebellion of Negroes in central cities, and the
reaction was one of fear and eventually panic."5 Indeed, the "urban crisis" as a term
gained currency during a period of violent social upheavals lasting from the mid-1960s
until the late 1960s. These upheavals symbolized the protest of the powerless against the
misery of the massive urban ghettos of America.
In this period, many African Americans came into conflict with the insufficiency
of existing political institutions they challenged the inadequate responses of the state to
the problems of inequality in American society. When traditional forms of
institutionalized political activity failed to end racial discrimination and create equal
economic opportunity in America, many young African Americans who had bome more
than their share of the burden of uneven postwar development rejected this approach and
sought to reassert their control of the city in a series of violent urban revolts. The imagery
of a civil war breaking out in the massive urban ghettoes of America conveyed a sense of
crisis that led the state to try to satisfy social discontent and hold back demands for
radical political change by building a much more comprehensive welfare state than that
left over from the legacy of the New Deal. Indeed, the key to understanding the Great
Society is seeing how it functioned as part a larger political strategy.
4 Peter J. Steinberger, Ideology and the Urban Crisis (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985);
Michael P. Smith and Joe R. Feagin, The Bubbling Cauldron: Race, Ethnicity, and the Urban Crisis
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995).
5 Robert A. Beauregard, Voices ofDecline: The Postwar Fate of US Cities (Blackwell, Oxford, 1991), 169.
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Technocratic Social Knowledge and Social Policy
During the development of the Great Society social scientific experts were called upon in
large numbers to refine "solutions" to the "problems" of urban America. The origins of
the social policies of the Great Society have been the subject of systematic historical
investigations.6 These analyses have explored how, in response to the recognition that if
broad social improvement was to be achieved in urban America, social planning based on
knowledge about the city had to be produced. These analyses have also explored how the
activity of the state created demands for knowledge about the social problems that the
state intended to address. The penetration of the state into the city, as it increased
demands for knowledge about the city, which in turn increased demands for new
interventions in the city, led to a desire to systematize this process. To systematize the
process by which the state itself influences the production as well as the use of
knowledge was, in effect, to "scientize" it, i.e., to bring in scientifically informed experts
in the development and deployment of social policy. The "scientization" of social policy
led to the imposition of a distinctively technocratic perspective on the vision of the Great
6 See Sar A. Levitan and Robert Taggert, The Promise of Greatness (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1976); Henry J. Aaron, Politics and the Professors: The Great Society in Perspective (Washington: The
Brookings Institution, 1978); Alice O'Connor, Poverty Knowledge: Social Science, Social Policy, and the
Poor in Twentieth-Century U.S. History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 137-210; James T.
Patterson, America's Struggle Against Poverty in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1981), 97-192; Hugh Heclo, "The Political Foundations of Antipoverty Policy," in Fighting Poverty:
What Works and What Doesn't, ed. Sheldon H. Danziger (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986);
Robert H. Haverman, Poverty Policy and Poverty Research: The Great Society and the Social Sciences (
Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987); Ira Katznelson, "Was the Great Society a Lost
Opportunity?" in The Rise and Fall of the New Deal Order, 1930-1980, ed. Steve Fraser and Gary Gerstle
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 185-211; Allan J. Matusow, The Unraveling ofAmerica: A
History ofLiberalism in the 1960s (New York: Harper & Row, 1984), 217-274; John Morton Blum, Years
of Discord: American Politics and Society, 1961-1974 (New York: Norton, 1991); Gareth Davies, From
Opportunity to Entitlement: The Transformation and Decline of Great Society Liberalism (Lawrence:
University of Kansas Press, 1998); Sean J. Savage, JFK, LBJ, and the Democratic Party (Albany: State
University of New York Press, 2004), 91-142; G. Calvin MacKenzie and Robert Weisbrot, The Liberal
Hour: Washington and the Politics of Change in the 1960s (New York: Penguin, 2008).
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Society. The state was regarded as unitary, capable of action; the social sciences were
regarded as methodologically secure, capable of providing objective knowledge; and
society was regarded as organized, capable of being stabilized through the
implementation of social policy designed by experts.
To understand the origins of the social policies developed in this period, it is
necessary to understand what social scientific experts who designed the Great Society
were interested in when forming them, which reveals both their objectives as well as their
ability to reach them. Catalyzed by the sense that the city was beset by a series of crises
that required state intervention, the city became an object about which an enormous about
of social knowledge and expertise needed to be created for the state to properly act. The
urban crisis was analyzed as if it were the sum of a series of smaller, manageable crises
which were identified as key "social problems" to be treated as specialized, even
technical phenomena for experts to solve with a series of social policy innovations. As Ira
Katznelson has noted, the "targets of these public polices were not objects of compassion,
but of fear born of uncertainty." 8 Urban America came to be seen by the state as a failed
social system that required social reengineering by experts.9 As lMichael Katz has
explained, many of the social scientists that designed the social policies of the Great
Society assumed that "dependent people were mainly helpless and passive, unable,
without the help of liberal intellectuals, to break the cycle of deprivation and degradation
7 Mark I. Gelfand, "How Cities Arrived on the National Agenda in the United States," in Financing Urban
Government in the Welfare State, ed., Douglas E. Ashford (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980), 210-236.
8 Ira Katznelson, City Trenches: Urban Politics and the Patterning of Class in the United States (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1981), 3.
9 Francis Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward, Regulating the Poor: The Functions ofPublic Welfare (New
York: Vintage, 1971), 249.
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that characterized their lives."10 The Great Society was thus designed in a way that
reinforced the ideal of the technocratic management of social relations as a solution to
social problems.
This ideal was exemplified by the creation of the Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD) on September 9, 1965, giving the United States the capacity
to develop an "urban policy" for the first time in its history. The Johnson administration
wanted HUD to do more than simply continue the postwar policies of large-scale urban
renewal that had come to be seen as at least partially responsible for the continued
decline of cities. Instead, HUD was to develop and deploy social policy innovations
designed to improve the "social health" of urban America. The disillusionment with the
destructiveness of urban renewal, the urgency of complex interracial tensions arising
from social unrest in America's cities, and the faith that social scientific expertise would
produce more effective state interventions-all of these forces shaped the activity of the
state with respect to the urban crisis.
From its inception, HUD was to provide resources for accumulating appropriate,
policy-relevant social knowledge based on systematic research on the city. As Robert C.
Weaver, the first secretary of HUD, explained, what was needed to implement the vision
of the Great Society was a "whole new order of urban experts" to assist the state in
systematically acquiring the knowledge it required to effectively intervene in the dynamic
environment of urban America." However, to achieve these goals would have required
the United States to adopt social democratic policies involving extensive state
10 Michael Katz, The Undeserving Poor: From the War on Poverty to the War on Welfare, New York:
Pantheon Books, 1989), 17.
" Robert C. Weaver, The Urban Opportunity: Roles for the University (Washington: United States
Government Printing Office, 1967), 11.
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interventions in the market. Indeed, the most conspicuous characteristic of the Great
Society was that from the beginning it conceded to the framework of the larger political
economy of the period.' 2 As Susan and Norman Fainstein have shown, while the
problems of the city in the United States were the most severe of any advanced capitalist
industrial society, it also had the most underdeveloped capacity to effectively respond to
them.' 3 In other words, despite the creation of HUD, the United States still lacked any
strong policy instruments for dealing with the problems of the city. The capacity of the
state to respond to the urban crisis was thus severely restricted. Instead of addressing the
underlying causes of postwar social conflict-namely, the unequal distribution of power
and resources-the social policies of the Great Society were limited to implementing
temporary improvements in the social conditions of the economically marginalized
populations of urban America.'4 This reflected a distinctively technocratic style of
politics that focused on questions of management, yet just what the problems of
management were, and how social policies should be designed in order to manage them,
remained a question.' 5
12 In the opinion of James Tobin, a member of President John F. Kennedy's Council of Economic Advisors
in the early 1960s who in collaboration with Arthur Okun, Robert Solow and Kenneth Arrow helped design
the Keynesian economic policy implemented by the Kennedy administration, the success of a robust
macroeconomic strategy was the foundation for the advances of liberal social policy in the Johnson
administration: "With new resources unendingly provided by growth, public services could be expanded
and upgraded, social insurance and income assistance extended, a war on poverty launched-all without
divisive conflicts over taxes, the size of the public sector, defense spending, and the distribution of income
and wealth. Stable, rapid, non-cyclical, non-inflationary growth was to be the underpinning of the Great
Society." See James Tobin, "The Political Economy of the 1960s," in Policies for Prosperity: Essays in a
Keynesian Mode, ed. Peter M. Jackson (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987), 422.
" Susan S. Fainstein and Norman I. Fainstein, "National Policy and Urban Development," Social Problems
26 (1978): 125-46.
14 John H. Mollenkopf, The Contested City (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), 25-67.
15 See Francis Fox Piven, "The Great Society as Political Strategy," in The Politics of Turmoil, ed., Richard
A. Cloward and Frances Fox Piven (New York: Pantheon Books, 1974), 271-83.
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State Strategies of Social Conflict Management
The technocratic social policy-makers of the Great Society faced fundamental questions
about the capacity of the state to resolve the social conflicts arising in America's cities. In
reciprocal fashion, there were indications that the growing complexity of the
responsibilities of the state called for new forms expertise to achieve greater control over
the effects of its actions.16 Excitement over the new techniques of management used in
the Department of Defense inspired policy makers to apply these very same technocratic
planning methods to solve the problems of urban America. Many scientists and engineers
transferred their wartime experience to the challenge of postwar urban problems, As
Jennifer S. Light has shown.' 7 Social scientific technologies such as "systems analysis,"
pioneered first in military affairs in the 1950s to grapple with the logistics of national
security were employed to this end.
In the late 1940s and early 1950s systems analysis was developed at the RAND
Corporation as a rational means of comparing the costs and risks of decision-making. In
the beginning of its development, systems analysis was part of a set of techniques
pioneered in the hope of creating a science of war. The word "systems" indicated that
every decision should be considered in a broad context, while the word "analysis"
emphasized the desire to reduce a complex problem to its most basic elements. While
these efforts to create a science of war were mostly unsuccessful, systems analysis
became popular in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. The methods of systems
16 Sonja Michelle Amadae, Rationalizing Capitalist Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
2003), 2947.
17 Jennifer S. Light, From Warefare to Welfare: Defense Intellectuals and Urban Problems in Cold War
America (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2003).
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analysis expanded into new fields, which synthesized knowledge from other branches of
science as a strategy of solving complex governmental problems in situations of
uncertainty. In David R. Jardini's analysis of the relocation of systems thinking from the
"security policy" of the Department of Defense to the social policy of the Great Society,
he argues "that the construction and implementation of the Great Society social welfare
programs were fundamentally shaped by Cold War techniques as RAND alumni and their
analytical methods can be found at the core of Great Society policy-making."' 8
Recognizing that uprisings in urban America were based in part on the discontent
of urban populations with unresponsive political institutions, planners at RAND and in
the federal government believed that social discontent could be managed with such
techniques, thus increasing the state's power to impose social control. The usage of these
techniques by the state was also seen as a way to systematize the relation of the
production of social knowledge and the implementation of social policy in state
interventions. New policy instruments were deployed to measure the effects of social
policy interventions according to the criteria of efficiency. Individual social programs
were evaluated with new scientific methodologies, experiments were conducted on
alternative social policy approaches to the problems of urban America, and the socio-
economic conditions of cities were carefully monitored over time. The compensation of
liberal democratic participation was to be made superfluous through new state techniques
of macrosociological conflict management.
The seduction of the technocratic option to liberals during the period of the Great
'
8 David R. Jardini, "Out of the Blue Yonder: The Transfer of Systems Thinking from the Pentagon to the
Great Society, 1961-1965," in Systems, Experts, and Computers: The Systems Approach in Management
and Engineering, World War II and After, ed. Agatha C. Hughes and Thomas P. Hughes (Cambridge: MIT
Press: 2000), 312.
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Society was that it promised to take the contest out of politics-indeed, to take the
politics out of politics. From this technocratic perspective, only technically trained
experts had the knowledge necessary to govern, effectively rendering traditional liberal
democratic politics obsolete. However, the ideal of the scientific management of social
conflict was no closer to realization in the late 1960s than it was in the early 1960s when
systems analysis and other techniques of rational state planning began to be used to solve
the problems of urban America, the only difference being that the use of such methods
had become prevalent.19 There was beginning to be a significant political backlash
against the use of these techniques. That their use had not in fact achieved this ideal was
becoming increasingly clear, as the highly idealized vision of the state as an agent of
positive social control that had been promoted by the social policy-makers of the Great
Society was slowly undermined by the sheer scale of urban turmoil.
Further Into the Urban Crisis
One of the most brutal riots in American history broke out in Detroit, Michigan on July
23, 1967.20 Early in the morning, police raided an illegal after-hours bar in the center of
Detroit's massive urban ghetto, where people were celebrating the return of two African
American soldiers from Vietnam. They were expecting to arrest a few patrons, but
instead found a crowd of people inside. The police decided to arrest everyone present.
While they waited for reinforcements, a crowd gathered in protest. It is still not clear
19 Jeffrey D. Straussman, The Limits of Technocratic Politics (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers,
1978), 10-15.
20 Sidney Fine, Violence in the Model City: The Cavanagh Administration, Race Relations, and the Detroit
Riot of 1967 (Ann Arbor: Michigan State University Press, 1989).
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exactly what happened next, but within the hour, a riot erupted that raged out of control.
The riot was the deadliest of the 1960s.2 By the end of 1967, riots had occurred in 164
cities across the United States. While the riot in Detroit was underway, Johnson created
the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders. The Commission was tasked
with determining the causes of the riots of 1967 and with making a proposal to assist the
state in preventing such events in the future.
The publication in February of 1968 of the National Advisory Commission on
Civil Disorders constituted the next significant blow to the technocratic vision of the
Great Society. The report argued that the riots were protests by local neighborhood
residents rather than meaningless outbursts of violence and mobilized evidence on an
array of social, political, and economic problems that were suffered with particular
severity by African Americans. The report warned that the United States was "moving
toward two societies, one black, one white-separate and unequal."2 3 Their report also
contained the following testimony from the sociologist, Kenneth Clark: "I must again in
candor say to you the members of this Commission-it is a kind of Alice in
Wonderland-with the same moving picture re-shown over and over again, the same
analysis, the same recommendations and the same inaction."24 No single solution,
whether directed to housing, employment, or education would alleviate the problems that
led to the riots, the report stated. Rather, all solutions must be implemented at once, and
21 Heather Ann Thompson, Whose Detroit? Politics, Labor, and Race in a Modern America City (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 2004), 42.
22 Kevin Mumford, "Harvesting the Crisis: The Newark Uprising, the Kerner Commission, and Writings on
Riots," in African American Urban History Since World War II, ed. Kenneth L. Kusmer and Joe William
Trotter (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009).
23 National Advisory Committee on Civil Disorders, Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil
Disorders (New York: Bantam Books, 1968), 1.
2 4 Ibid., 483.
15
only then, their report claimed, would "new patterns of behavior and social organization
emerge in the central cities." 25 The report sought to refocus the discourse of the urban
crisis from the superficial physical manifestations of urban violence to the problems of
the structural inequalities of American society. It was agreed that something about the
"system" itself had to be transformed.
Johnson was angered by their indictment of his efforts, and did not agree with his
commission's findings. They were rejected and their recommendations were ignored.26
The next blow to the Great Society was the final one. The murder of Dr. Martin Luther
King Jr. on April 4, 1968, catalyzed a new wave of riots in 130 cities all over the United
States-including Boston, Baltimore, Chicago, Detroit, Newark, New York City, and
Washington, D.C. The worst revolts occurred in Washington, D.C.27 The 1968 riots were
the most widespread of the 1960s. By this time, the years for major social welfare
legislation were over as the war in Southeast Asia assumed increased significance. This
contradiction was not lost on many liberals, who believed that one war was being traded
in for another, with both spiraling equally out of control. In spite of the deployment of a
series of new social programs targeting urban America, cities across the nation continued
to erupt in protest. The policy-makers of the Great Society were at a loss to explain these
events. The escalation of violence in urban America dramatically revealed both the true
2 Ibid., 35.
26 James T. Patterson, Grand Expectations: The United States, 1945-1975 (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1996), 668.
27 Howard Gilette, Between Justice And Beauty: Race, Planning, and the Failure of Urban Policy in
Washington (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1995), 27-29; Ben W. Gilbert et al., Ten Blocks
from the White House: Anatomy of the Washington Riots of 1968 (New York: Frederick A. Praeger
Publishers, 1968), 45; Manfred Berg, "1968: A Turning Point in American Race Relations?" in 1968: The
World Transformed, ed. Caroline Fink, Phillip Gassert, and Detleft Junker (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1998), 406.
16
magnitude of the urban crisis, as well as the limits of the state's capacity to properly
resolve it.
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Chapter 2:
The Engineers and the Urban System, 1968-1969
The Urban Systems Laboratory (USL) was established in 1968 at the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology (MIT) with a sense of urgency. "The problem of the city,"
explained MIT President Howard W. Johnson in a letter to McGeorge Bundy, President
of the Ford Foundation, "presents itself as a complex of poverty, racial strife, crime,
physical and aesthetic decay, ineffective public education, and the progressive breakdown
of its services in housing transportation, health, sanitation, and government."28 "This
picture," he added, "is one of social and economic disintegration that affects the vitality
of democracy in serious ways., 29 In 1967 Johnson submitted a proposal to the Ford
Foundation arguing that MIT's proficiency in science and technology, as well as its
expertise in urban affairs, should be developed into a project of research to involve all of
the resources of the Institute. It was only with such a large-scale interdisciplinary effort,
Johnson argued, that MIT could begin to face the challenges of the urban crisis.
However, as Charles L. Miller, the Executive Director of the USL, and the former head
of the Department of Civil Engineering, indicated, the "problems faced by the USL, the
problems of the city... are the broadest and most complex problems ever faced by MIT." 30
By the late 1960s, MIT had already developed a capacity to generate urban
2 8 
"Letter from Howard W. Johnson to Mr. McGeorge Bundy, President of The Ford Foundation, February
24, 1967," 1, Ford Foundation - Urban Studies Proposal, MIT Corporation, Office of the Chairman,
Records, 1965-1983, AC-1 18, Box 167, Folder 1, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Institute Archives
and Special Collections, Cambridge, Massachusetts [hereafter AC 118].
29 Ibid., 2.
30 Charles L. Miller, "Urban Systems Laboratory," in Massachusetts Institute of Technology Bulletin:
Report ofthe President 1968 (December 1968), 490.
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expertise through the Joint Center for Urban Studies. Established in 1959, the Center was
designed to address social policy issues confronting a nation experiencing widespread
economic and social transformations, with dramatic effects on urban America in
particular. Martin Meyerson of Harvard Lloyd Rodwin of MIT imagined that the Center
would function in a way that was analogous to scientific laboratories in other fields.'
With support from the Ford Foundation, the research agenda of the Center was based on
the premise that the resolution of the complex political issues facing urban America
called for the production of expertise about the city. The idea that the production of
expertise alone would solve the problems of the cities strongly reflected the interests of
its patron. In the 1960s the Ford Foundation imposed a technocratic vision of social
change as a question of developing appropriate social-scientific expertise and
discouraging public involvement in order to minimize political resistance from below.
MIT's relationship with the Ford Foundation immersed the Institute into the
network of power the Foundation rapidly established in the postwar period. The
Foundation had ties with many powerful officials in government. Thus a process was
established in which an exchange of interests, expertise and funding took place between
MIT, the Ford Foundation and the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. The influence
of the Ford Foundation was also imposed upon the USL. However, its mission differed
significantly from that of the Center. By the late 1960s, the Center had come to be seen as
traditional, rather than innovative. Unlike the Center, which included the humanities in its
research, the USL was strictly oriented around the development of scientific and
technical expertise, not only reflecting the Ford Foundation's interest in the latest
31 Eugene L. Birch, "Making Urban Research Intellectually Respectable: Martin Meyerson and the Joint
Center for Urban Studies of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Harvard University, 1959-
1964," Journal ofPlanning History 10 (2011): 219-238.
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intellectual fashions of technocratic social engineering, but also IT's desire to capitalize
on the growth of techno-scientific research pursued under government and
nongovernment contract. As Johnson explained to Bundy, "We anticipate a situation in
five to ten years when project and fellowship funds in urban studies... will be comparable
with the financing which society now provides for other fields considered to be of high
national priority. MIT received $3,000,000 in grants from the Ford Foundation, and
$800,000 of the grant was dedicated to establishing the USL. Upon the bestowal of this
grant, a Ford Foundation press release stated that "despite engagement of many talented
persons, the outlay of substantial public and private funding, and the initiation of many
reforms and innovations in urban affairs, the root problems of American cities remain
largely unsolved, complex, and explosive."33 This suggested a novel approach was
needed which would focus systematically on the most serious of urban problems. The
founders of the USL believed that, while only experts would solve these problems, these
experts did not yet exist.
Urban Systems Research
The aim of the USL was to develop a broad institutional framework at MIT for
interdisciplinary research on the city. This idea in itself posed a series of problems that
had to be resolved before the USL could be established. While MIT had experience in
organizing interdisciplinary research and large-scale project laboratories in engineering
"Letter from Howard W. Johnson to Mr. McGeorge Bundy, President of The Ford Foundation, February
24, 1967," (1967), AC118, 2.
33 "News from the Ford Foundation, November 30, 1967," (1967), AC 118, 1.
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and applied science-such as, for example, at the Research Laboratory of Electronics, the
Lincoln Laboratory and the Instrumentation Laboratory-the USL was the first to
combine architecture, urban planning, management, and the social sciences as well as
engineering on a major scale. The key to the effort to encourage all of the resources of the
Institute to join in the mission of the USL was the employment of the concept of
"system" in defining the object that this interdisciplinary institutional framework would
be built to explore. As this concept was used across the arts and sciences, it suggested
that every department and discipline could contribute to the USL without sacrificing its
specific area of expertise. However, the conception of the "urban," once paired with the
concept of "systems," had undergone a significant conceptual transformation. The idea of
"urban systems" called to mind the underlying social, political, and economic processes
of the city, and not merely the physical manifestation of the city as built form. This too
suggested that the USL had the potential to be a great success, insofar as no one
discipline could claim the "urban system" as its own, thus requiring an effort of
collaboration in order to explore a new style of research that lacked traditional
disciplinary identifications.
It was obvious to the founders of the USL that urban problems could not be
regarded as separate from each other and that they appeared to demand an
interdisciplinary approach if they were to be tackled effectively. The style of research that
arose in order to face this challenge was known as "urban systems research," and was
loosely defined at the USL as the utilization of the methodology of systems theory,
systems analysis, systems engineering, and related social technology as applied to the
"social problems" of housing, education, transportation, environmental quality control,
21
health, and community development. Nevertheless, in this research the very conception
of the city lost its political significance and no longer offered any precisely defined object
of study, as the "urban" became identified with the "social" in general. Research at the
USL emphasized not just rebuilding urban America, but planning social rehabilitation,
designing systems of social service delivery, and inventing new techniques of social
management requiring the management and sharing of large quantities of information
with the use of a computer. As MIT Provost Jerome Wiesner explained, the computer
was an ideal instrument to explore the problems of the city because of its capacity to
enhance "the ability of the human brain to deal with the complexities of the molecules of
life, the mysteries of the cosmos, and man's urban existence."34
As the USL Executive Director Charles L. Miller argued, it was the computer that
brought the interdisciplinary activities of the USL together. "Access to an experimentally
oriented computer" was, he explained, "essential to new research in urban information
systems, urban simulation, and urban design as planned by many groups associated with
U.S.L." 35 The centrality of the computer in this research, he added, "has led the USL to
acquire a time-shared 360/67 IBM computer in MIT's new Information Processing
Services Center"36 (Figures 1-13). By the late 1960s, MIT was known for many of the
most significant technological achievements in computers, and with the establishment of
the USL, was set to explore the power of the computer to establish a community of
3 Jerome Wiesner, "Urban Problems in the Light of Technological Opportunities," in Federal Role in
Urban Affairs: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Executive Reorganization of the Committee on
Government Operations, United States Senate, April 13, 1967, 90* Cong. (Washington: United States
Government Printing Office, 1967), 3246.
" "Urban Systems Lab Installs New Computer," News Release Special to The Tech, September 23, 1968,
MIT Urban Systems Laboratory Records, 1968-1974, AC-366, Institute Archives and Special Collections,
MIT Libraries, Cambridge, Massachusetts [hereafter AC366].
36 "The Laboratory That Isn't," Technology Review 71 (1968): 92.
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researchers at MIT working on urban problems collaboratively through a time-sharing
computer system.
The IBM 360/System Model 67, Time-Sharing Systems, and Urban Systems
Research
Upon its release in 1964, the IBM System/360 was one of the most widely sought-after
computing systems in the world." It was the first family of computers designed by IBM
to cover a range of applications. Before the release of the IBM System/360, computers
were built for special purposes and required an enormous technical staff to operate at
great cost. The IBM System/360 changed all that, and was extremely successful in the
market as a result. 38 However, the corporate vision of computers, exemplified in design
of the IBM System/360, was still of machines that merely provided data management for
large organizations. The manufacturers of these systems did not consider them to be
experimental. It was left to universities like MIT to explore their experimental potential.
The Model 67 version of the IBM System/360 the USL acquired in 1968 was principally
the result of the research of computer scientists at MIT in the 1960s.
The Model 67 was unique in the System/360 family because it allowed users at
remote computer consoles to communicate directly with the system, a capability known
as "time-sharing."39 Time-sharing systems provided a more democratic distribution of
3 7 Emerson W. Pugh, Lyle R. Johnson, and John H. Palmer, IBM's 360 and Early 370 Systems (Cambridge:
MIT Press, 1991), 15-75.
3 8 Ibid., 85.
3 9 Charles T. Gibson, "Time-sharing in the IBM System/360: Model 67," in Proceedings ofthe Spring Joint
Computer Conference, April 26-28, 1966 (New York: Macmillan, 1966), 61-78.
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computational resources to a number of users at different terminals. 4 0 The invention of
time-sharing operating systems also catalyzed the interactive use of computers. 41 The
Compatible Time-Sharing System (CTSS), developed the MIT Computation Center in
the early 1960s, was one of the first time-sharing operating systems in the world.42 In the
early 1960s, there were two versions of the CTSS operating at MIT on two IBM 7094
Data Processing Systems, one at the Computation Center, and another at MIT's Project
MAC (Project on Mathematics and Computation).
In the mid-1960s MIT began to look for a new time-sharing operating system.
This system became Multics (Multiplexed Information and Computer Service), which
was intended to be a time-sharing operating system capable of supporting hundreds of
users across the Institute. In 1966, Fernando J. Corbat6, the designer of the Multics
project, and Robert Fano, the director of Project MAC, wrote an influential article for
Scientific American in which they argued that time-sharing operating systems such as
CTSS and Multics would have a profound impact not only on the future of the computer
but on the future of society as well. "Communities will design systems," they indicated,
"to perform various functions-intellectual, economic and social-and the systems in
turn undoubtedly will have profound effects in shaping the patterns of human life." 4 3
They predicted the development of new systems of social organization arising between
interactive computer systems and its users that "will create new services, new institutions,
40 Paul E. Ceruzzi, A History ofModern Computing (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998), 155.
41 Janet Abbate, Inventing the Internet (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999), 24-27.
42 Paul E. Ceruzzi, A History ofModern Computer, 157.
43 Fernando J. Corbat6 and Robert M. Fano, "Time-sharing on computers," Scientific American, September
3, 1966, 129.
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a new environment and new problems." 44
The USL was part of an effort at MIT to lay the immense institutional
infrastructure that was necessary to explore Corbat6 and Fano's vision. As Miller
explained, "The 360/E will be to the USL what the 7094/CTSS has been to MAC, and the
joint development of an experimental urban information system will be to the USL what
MULTICS is to MAC."45 "The USL," Miller indicated, echoing Corbat6 and Fano's
1966 article, "is an open community, open to all faculty, staff members, and students who
find that they can be more effective in the field of urban systems by being active
members of the community." 46 "Just as in the case of the city," he added, "the citizens of
USL should have a voice in what USL should be, what it should do, and how it should
operate and function.' 4 7 That the computer was a technology to be used at the USL in its
capacity to generate and share knowledge is clear. It was also a technology about which
knowledge was to be generated, however. To get a sense of the role the computer played
in the research at the USL, both as a subject and an object of research, we may look to a
conference jointly organized by MIT and the Technische Universitat of Berlin in the
summer of 1968, to which a large contingent of the faculty involved in the USL was
invited to present their research.
From the Complexities of Urban Existence to Urban Systems Engineering
"The computer is one of the foremost examples of technology working for man-
4 Ibid., 132.
41 "USL 360/E Plan, Urban Affairs - Urban Systems Lab., 1/'68-6/69," (1968) ACi 18.
4 Charles L. Miller, "Urban Systems Laboratory," 491.
4' Ibid.
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expanding our ability to comprehend, to evaluate, and in many ways to control our
resources and our environment," explained MIT President Johnson in his address to open
the conference. 48 "It is probable," he added, "that the potential of the computer is limited
only by our imagination."49 In a session on the "Manipulation of Complex Systems by
Use of the Computer," Nicholas Negroponte and Aaron Fleisher of the School of
Architecture and Planning spoke about their recent experiments in computer-aided
design.50 Negroponte had founded the Architecture Machine Group in the School of
Architecture and Planning at MIT in 1967 to explore the use of computers in architecture
and urban planning. Negroponte used the USL to further this research.
Inspired, in part, by such sources as Ivan Sutherland's 1963 Sketchpad design
program and Marvin Minsky's ideas of artificial intelligence, the research of the
Architecture Machine Group was based on the idea that the architect is "an unnecessary
and even detrimental middleman between individual, continuously changing needs and
the continuous incorporation of those needs into the built environment." 5' The computer,
they argued, inaugurated a new era of design by providing a new intellectual utility
allowing people to design their own environments. They reasoned that individuals should
have greater power to control their own environment, instead of being controlled by it,
and envisioned the possibility of a technological utopia of architecture without architects.
The idea of accessibility was central to this research, and in their talk Negroponte and
Fleischer spoke of computers as the catalyst of a utopia of design that would strengthen
48 "Spiel mit MAC: A Berlin Conference," Technology Review 71 (1968), 73.
49 TIid.
50 The Computer in the University: Joint Summer Conference, Technische Universitut Berlin, July 22 to
August 2, 1968 (Berlin: Technische Universitat, 1968), 25-26.
51 Nicholas Negroponte, The Architecture Machine: Toward a More Human Environment (Cambridge:
MIT Press, 1970), 6.
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American democracy. Negroponte and Fleisher were interested in how computers
suggested a new paradigm of agency to take back control of urban America.
Yet Negroponte and Fleischer's vision of the role of the computer in society did
not go far enough in the opinion of MIT Professor of Management, Jay W. Forrester,
another associate of the USL who attended the conference in Berlin (Figure 14). "In the
meeting so far," he stated, "most of our attention has been directed toward computer
systems, toward physical systems of various kinds, toward software systems and this
morning, toward architectural design systems."52 "But it would seem," he continued,
"that most of our problems today, lie not so much in the technical as they do in the areas
of our social systems."53 "There is ample evidence in every newspaper," he explained,
"that man neither understands nor has mastery of his social systems."5 4 "Economic crises,
inflation, international conflict, failures in developing nations, price instability in world
commodities, urban deterioration, student unrest, population pressures, and the stresses
between the individual and the organization," he added, "all reveal our failure to master
the social dynamic of our environment."55 Forrester did not refer to any specific event,
but he did not have to. The year of 1968 received its singular historical significance, at
least for Americans at this time, through the convergence of a series of events that
marked a unique period of social instability-the Tet Offensive, President Johnson's
withdrawal from the 1968 campaign, Martin Luther King, Jr.'s assassination and the riots
that followed, Robert F. Kennedy's assassination, the mayhem of the Democratic
52 "Transcript of Lecture, "Complex Social Systems," July 31, 1968," p. 1, MIT - TUB Berlin Conference,
July 22, 1968 - August 8, 1968, Jay W. Forrester Papers, MC-439, Box 17, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, Institute Archives and Special Collections, Cambridge, Massachusetts [hereafter MC439].
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Convention in Chicago, student protests, and above all, the most violent period of the war
in Southeast Asia.
Forrester presented research that would be published in 1969 as Urban Dynamics.
Using the IBM Systems/360 Model 67 installed at the USL in 1968, Forrester had built a
large-scale, interactive, computational model of a hypothetical urban environment. He
used this model of a city like a laboratory for the study of urban social structures,
processes, and systems. He argued in his presentation that, unlike methods of analysis
that rely on the limited cognitive capacity of a human, with the use of the computer he
was able explore the real consequences of the engineering of complex social systems.
Forrester argued that social policies can be mathematically tested by experimenting with
interactive computer models to calculate their effects, intended and unintended. In this
way, he argued, one could reach politically neutral, systematic, and scientific conclusions
and avoid the inconsistent, inefficient, and ineffective results of mere intuition. His
specific aim was to offer a new policy instrument for analyzing the social policies of the
Great Society. The complexity of urban America, he suggested, was a kind of complexity
that only an urban policy-maker armed with a computer could master. Forester held that
the city could be seen as a system that could be reengineered to reverse the social entropy
he identified with urban America.
Forrester argued that if a state of the art information processing system reliably
processed a vast quantity of data rapidly enough to analyze and design other complex
technological systems-such as, for example, in the Apollo Program-then such a
system might also be used to tackle problems of much greater complexity, such as the
city. To Forrester, the computer opened up an epistemological space free of the political
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polarizations of the period, a space in which to analyze the social, economic and political
complexities of urban existence while simultaneously being insulated from it. More than
any other research at the USL, Forrester's work was haunted by the specter-as well as
the seduction-of a cybernetic self-organization of society, i.e., a technological utopia of
social control incorporating rationalized planning techniques for identifying social
problems, inventing policy strategies to solve them, stimulating the consequences of
these policies, then sending back this information to centers of centralized decision
making-a process made possible by the integration of the system, the computer, and the
expert. The way Forrester looked at the city was shaped by his work following World
War II.
The Genealogy of an Engineer: From Project Whirlwind to IndustrialDynamics
Forrester emerged as a major computer pioneer in the MIT Servomechanism Laboratory
immediately following World War II where he managed the design of a high-speed
digital computer named "Project Whirlwind."5 6 In the late 1940s, the threat of Soviet
bombers forced military officials to consider the construction of an air defense system for
North America. In response, the MIT Lincoln Laboratory was established in 1951, and
Project Whirlwind was transferred to the Lincoln Laboratory." Forrester became the
director of Division 6 at the Lincoln Laboratory, where he continued work on Project
Whirlwind. By the mid-1950s, the Lincoln Laboratory had in operation a the prototype of
56 Kent C. Redmond and Thomas M. Smith, From Whirlwind to Mitre: The R&D Story of the Sage Air
Defense Computer (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000), 181-222.
5 7 Ibid., 151.
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the computer that eventually ran the Semi-Automated Ground Environment (SAGE)
land-based air defense system in the early 1950s, a computerized air defense system for
all of North America. This system was the first interactive application of computers in the
world. Though SAGE was strictly an air defense system, as Thomas Parke Hughes has
explained, "it can also be described as an information-processing and real-time control
system."58 It is hard to exaggerate the extent of its influence on the development of the
computer. Even before the system was deployed in 1958, the SAGE project had begun to
train an entire generation of computer engineers, computer programmers, and cognitive
scientists. In retrospect, it has come to symbolize cold war technocracy.59
On the advice of MIT President James R. Killian, Forrester left his post as the
leader of Division 6 at the Lincoln Laboratory to join the MIT Sloan School of
Management in 1956. Forrester was a perfect match for Sloan. His experiences as the
manager of Project Whirlwind and the largest division of the Lincoln Laboratory led him
to conclude that the biggest impediment to greater levels of efficiency in large-scale
technocratic endeavors was not due to the engineering side of "industrial problems," but
from the management side of "human problems." This was due to the fact that, as he
explained, "social systems are much harder to control than are physical systems."6 0 At
Sloan, Forrester became interested in the mathematical modeling of complex social
systems with the use of a computer, an area of research he referred to as "systems
dynamics." Forrester employed the engineering term "dynamics" to indicate that his
models provided the ability to study situations of complexity as they evolved over time.
5 8 Thomas Parke Hughes, Rescuing Prometheus (New York: Vintage, 1988), 87.
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In particular, systems dynamics was created for the analysis and the design of "policy,"
by which Forrester meant the rules by which decisions are made.6 i
This method of analysis led to the creation of a special computer language called
DYNAMO (DYNAmic Models), written by Phyllis Fox and Alexander Pugh, which was
both a simulation language and a graphical notation system6 2 (Figure 15). This program
allowed Forrester not only to quickly build computer models of great complexity, but to
visualize them as well. Forrester began his systems dynamics research by modeling the
process of decision-making in a corporation to gauge how such unruly forces as the
interrelation of flows of information, labor, money, and materials-when manipulated in
the model-could be redesigned to increase the efficiency of these processes. His goal
was to provide a model of a corporation to allow managers to make better decisions
(Figure 16). This research was published in 1961 as Industrial Dynamics (Figures 17-
18).
The underlying implication of Industrial Dynamics was that managers of large
industrial corporations could use computers to give more consideration to recursive
processes of interaction in complex social systems. Inspired by the research behind
Industrial Dynamics, Forrester began to see the computer as providing answers to some
of the most perplexing problems facing society, namely, the problems of control in highly
organized social systems. Forrester began to reconceputalize the computer as a
technology of social control just as the systems sciences were beginning to flourish.
These sciences were united by a shared concern with the problems of control in highly
organized social systems. Forrester's system dynamics became a major area of research
6 1 Ibid., 15.
6 2 Alexander L. Pugh, DYNAMO User's Manual (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1963), 15.
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at Sloan in the 1960s, where it was applied almost exclusively to managerial problems of
corporate America. In 1968, however, a new friendship compelled Forrester to broaden
his expertise beyond corporate modeling, and face the "dynamics" of urban America.
The Mayor's Expertise in Urban Machine Politics
On January 2, 1968, the former Mayor of Boston, John F. Collins became a Visiting
Professor of Urban Affairs at MIT in three different departments: Political Science, the
Alfred P. Sloan School of Management, and Civil Engineering. It was the day after the
end of his second term as Mayor63 (Figure 19). In the 1950s, Collins had been stricken
with polio, and at MIT he required an office in a building with disability access. By
chance, Forrester's office was located in such a building and the office next to his was
vacant. The two began to engage in regular conversations about the problems of urban
America and how Forrester's research might be used to address these problems. The
chemistry of their collaboration catalyzed for each of them the sense of their own
prestige. Each recognized that the other brought a set of skills to bear in their
conversations that reinforced their respective areas of expertise, scientific and political. In
particular, they shared a managerial vision of the city. Forrester was inclined to view
everything he studied as a problem of management, and Collins viewed his former role as
Mayor as a managerial one. As MIT President Howard W. Johnson stated, "the
appointment of Mayor Collins represents an important step in developing a broadened
program of study and research in urban affairs at MIT. He will bring to the Institute a
63 "MIT Names Mayor Collins Professor of Urban Affairs," Boston Herald Traveler, Tuesday, July 11,
1967, 1.
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keen knowledge of urban problems and the complexities of managing a city." 64
Johnson's statement contained no mention of the controversy that Collins'
administration had generated over the previous decade. The administration of Mayor
Collins had focused upon the revitalization of the downtown business district, on
maximizing private sector investment, and on rehabilitating selected neighborhoods to
attract the upper classes back to Boston at the expense of the rest of the city. From 1960
to 1968, he mobilized the powerful Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA), established
by his predecessor John B. Hynes in 1957, and pushed forward a series of large urban
redevelopment projects in an effort to build a "New Boston." 65 In 1960 Collins hired
New Haven city planner Edward J. Logue as director of the BRA. Together they
instigated what Logue later claimed was "the largest urban renewal program seriously put
forward anywhere up to that time."66 According to Lawrence W. Kennedy, "Nearly 50
percent of the population and one quarter of the city's land were located within the
designated renewal areas."6 7 Under Collins and Logue, Scollay Square was replaced with
Government Center and the new City Hall, Faneuil Hall and Quincy Market were
developed into commercial centers, and the Prudential Center was built as a major
commercial property (Figure 19). These projects not were regarded as universally
successful, however. 8
" "Statement by Howard W. Johnson, President, Massachusetts Institute of Technology," (1968), AC118.
65 Lawrence W. Kennedy, Planning the City Upon a Hill: Boston since 1630 (Amherst: University of
Massachusetts Press, 1992), 160; Mark I Gelfand, "Back to the Politics of the Future," in Snowbelt Cities:
Metropolitan Politics in the Northeast and Midwest since World War H, ed. Richard M. Bernard
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), 40-62.
* Edward J. Logue, "Boston, 1960-1967-Seven Years of Plenty," Proceedings of the Massachusetts
Historical Society 84 (1972): 82-96.
67 Lawrence W. Kennedy, Planning the City upon a Hill, 173.
68 Jon C. Teaford, The Rough Road to Renaissance: Urban Revitalization in America, 1940-1985
(Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1990), 7-8.
33
The political economy of postwar urban development in Boston produced a
greater chasm than before between the central downtown area and outer neighborhoods.
Amidst the riots and uprisings in America's urban areas during the 1960s, Boston was no
exception.69 For example, on June 2, 1967, members of Mothers for Adequate Welfare
(MAW), a local political organization, went to a welfare office in Roxbury to voice their
concern about the long waits to see social workers, and the insults and harassment they
received when they did get to see them. They demanded to speak with the local welfare
commissioner, and protested that the state welfare bureaucracy was being used
malevolently against them as an instrument of social control. 70 The women locked
themselves into the office and prevented welfare workers from leaving the building.
Mayor Collins called their peaceful political demonstration "the worst manifestation of
disrespect for the rights of others that this city has ever seen." 7' He called in police, who
charged through the windows. The brutality of the police angered the sympathizers of the
protesters picketing outside. They heard the women scream, and very quickly a riot
erupted. Nearly 200 people were arrested. A few weeks later, Collins was offered the job
at MIT.
The Mayor and the Engineer
In February of 1968, Forrester began work at the USL on building a computer model of a
69 William E. Nelson, Jr., Black Atlantic Politics: Dilemmas of Political Empowerment in Boston and
Liverpool (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000), 67.
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2001), 169.
71 Ibid., 180.
34
hypothetical American city. In order to create this model, Forrester synthesized his
technical expertise with the expertise of a committee of real-estate developers and
businessmen who had helped Collins in the 1960s to realize his vision of aNew Boston.
Forrester was impressed by their idea of the city as a product of managerial and
administrative decision-making. He was also deeply influenced by the idea that the most
important goal of a city was to drive economic growth. This idea was, after all, the
principle idea behind the urban development projects of the Collins administration. The
role of urban policy-makers, such as the Mayor, they argued, was to do everything in
their power to sustain economic growth. They had a poor opinion of the Great Society,
and specifically the so-called War on Poverty, which they saw as hindering postwar
economic growth and interfering with the governance of Boston. Forrester was
particularly impressed with Collins, who had shown that he was able to successfully
reestablish control of the city during a period of tremendous social turmoil. In a
reciprocal fashion, Collins was impressed by Forrester's research, as well as with the
research of the USL as a whole.
In an article published in 1968 entitled "Technology and the Urban Crisis,"
Collins rhetorically asked, "How can we as a nation contemplate such sophisticated
scientific and industrial goals as the conquest of space and yet make such a relatively
insignificant contribution to the improvement of the environment in which we live?"7 3
Echoing the rhetoric of the USL, he argued that to solve the urban crisis, "a systems
analysis of urban problems on a collective basis and an interdisciplinary assault by every
element of the nation, public and private, academicians, business, labor, civil rights-all
72 Jay W. Forrester, Urban Dynamics (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1969), ix.
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of these are required."7 4 Based on the conservations he had with Collins about the perils
of managing a large American city, armed with his research from Industrial Dynamics,
and utilizing the USL's IBM System/360 Model 67, Forrester bravely attempted a foray
into the dynamics of the urban crisis.
Into the Dynamics of the Urban Crisis
Forrester argued that he wanted to build a model that represented a "typical" central city
in the United States, with a particular emphasis on the plight of the so-called "decaying
inner-city."' Forrester considered the city to be a "closed social system" located within a
"limitless environment"'76 (Figure 20). As Forrester argued, "a city, while acted upon by
exogenous impulses from outside, can be treated as a system unto itself."7 7 Thus the
process of suburbanization, for example, was implicitly excluded from the model. He
argued that everything within the model would be generated through interactions with
other processes within this closed social system78 (Figure 21). In addition, no empirical
evidence was used in building the model. It was the former Mayor's job to verify its
accuracy. Nevertheless, Forrester believed that if the model was designed accurately
enough, he could demonstrate the behavior of growth and stability that was observable in
an actual city, and not merely in an abstract one.
First, Forrester utilized the latest version of the computer program DYNAMO he
74 Ibid., 20.
7 Jay W. Forrester, Urban Dynamics, 12.
76 Ibid., 15.
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78 Ibid., 17.
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developed in his work from Industrial Dynamics, once it was adapted by his assistants to
work on the Model 67 computer at the USL. He isolated variables that he believed
reasonably described the social and economic composition of an American city, as he had
done with corporations. The basic variables were chosen primarily with an eye to the
urban crisis: the existence of "slums," the unemployment caused by capital flight from
the city, and insufficient tax revenue due to rapid depopulation. Thus the structure of the
model consisted of a hierarchy of three subsystems that comprised the total "urban
system," namely industry, housing, and population. These subsystems interacted through
nine so-called "state" and twenty-two "rate" variables, such as "labor" and
"unemployment" 79 (Figure 22). These variables structured the parameters of every
possible interaction within Forrester's hypothetical urban system. The interrelationships
among the variables took the form of so-called "structural parameters, rate equations,
level equations, and auxiliary equations," which described the feed-back-like interactions
of industry, housing, and population with other variables and established in the form of
an abstract, analytical representation the structure of the urban system as a whole.
Forrester was then prepared to see what kind of behavior his hypothetical urban system
produced as it grew and evolved over time" (Figures 23-26).
Beginning with a fixed area of undeveloped land, the model generated a cycle of
development leading to full land use, which Forrester identified as a condition of social
and economic "equilibrium." His model of a hypothetical urban system generated a
visualization of the behavior of this system over a 250-year life cycle. This illustrated the
"growth and decay of the city," with "stagnation" setting in around the 150th year
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(Figures 27-29). Forrester's model generally produced a cycle of development in which,
after a long period of systematic urban development, eventually the beginnings of a
"crisis" set in. Using this model, Forrester then examined the effect of a range of social
policy options in order to analyze their performance in "real-time." He modeled many of
the social policies of the Great Society, and specifically those of the War on Poverty,
which were introduced into the model as modifications to the original equations. He then
produced a series of models that resulted from combinations of these policies. He met
frequently with the former Mayor to seek his advice on the ideal city, and tweaked the
model until he was satisfied that he had discovered the precise combination of policies to
produce this ideal. He then proposed a series of recommendations to urban policy-makers
to reach this ideal.
Even though Forrester noted the preliminary nature of his research in the
introduction to Urban Dynamics, he proposed dismantling virtually all of the major social
policies of the period. He specifically rejected as harmful the policies of the War on
Poverty. He discouraged these policies, arguing instead that without them the "natural"
development of the city would return to a condition of economic and social equilibrium.
He proposed what was, in effect, an anti-poverty program of his own, which was simply
to destroy every institution meant to help the poor. In this way, he reasoned, once the
social policies aimed at the poor were dismantled, there would be no incentive for the
poor to remain in the city, and thus the city would no longer have a poverty problem. His
vision of the city was grim indeed. In Forrester's hypothetical urban system, the poor
merely give birth to further poverty and remain imprisoned in the welfare system; the
unemployed appear to never escape unemployment; and the wealthy, identified as the
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"managerial class" in his model, struggle to reap the fruit from the downward social
spiral of the urban crisis. The policy-makers of the city are also trapped within this spiral,
introducing measures to solve social problems that only make them exponentially worse.
"This model of an urban system," he stated, "suggests that many past and present urban
programs may actually worsen the conditions they are intended to improve. Promising
alternative programs, addressed to the underlying causes of urban decay rather than to
symptoms, suggest different approaches." 81
More controversial than these ideas, however, was Forrester's explanation of why
the social policies of the Great society "may well be making matters worse...while policy
changes in exactly the opposite direction from present trends are needed if the decaying
inner city is to be revived."8 2 According to Forrester, the social policies of the Great
Society merely applied intuitive reasoning to the complex social system of urban
America. Forrester argued that the "interactions between economic and social activity are
so complex that intuition alone can not devise policies that prevent decay."83 "With a
high degree of confidence," Forrester argued, "we can say that the intuitive solutions to
the problems of complex social systems will be wrong most of the time. Here lies much
of the explanation for.. .troubles of urban area."84 The idea underlying Forrester's
arguments was that the urban crisis had been exacerbated by the state's attempt to resolve
it by social planning. With Forrester's Urban Dynamics we can see how, with the
national sense of urgency at its height, what would eventually crystallize into a
conservative vision of the urban crisis began to emerge.
"' Ibid., 2.
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Chapter 3:
The Anarchy of Expertise and the Rise of a Neoconservative Urbanism, 1969-1974
The publication of Urban Dynamics in 1969 generated a controversy. In the 1960s there
were numerous attempts to increase the effectiveness of the social policies aimed at urban
America, yet there were hardly any works of urbanism that proceeded from the opposite
perspective. Forrester's contribution to the debate on the urban crisis investigated the
social policies of the Great Society from the perspective of why they had been so
ineffective. This was due, he argued, to the fact that such strategies are systematically
restricted by the cognitive capacity of the designers of social policy. He also argued that
such efforts led to an excess of systemic planning failures. Urban Dynamics represented a
profound skepticism in the capacity of society to influence itself and its future
development by liberal democratic means of planning, intervention, and control. These
ideas by themselves might have generated a controversy, but they were not why Urban
Dynamics became the subject of a scandal.
The reason Urban Dynamics was so controversial was because of its implicitly
undemocratic premise that only experts should have the power to make decisions about
the future of the city. Forrester recommended that not just any kind of expert should have
this power, however, but only the kind of expert who knew how to utilize his highly
idiosyncratic program of research. To many, this was a ridiculous suggestion.8 5 To others,
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86it was a frightening one. It was this claim that instigated an overwhelming number of
negative reviews of Urban Dynamics.8 7 In Systems Analysis in Public Policy: A Critique,
the political scientist Ida R. Hoos ridiculed Urban Dynamics for its pretentions to
scientific rigor. "The procedures used by Forrester to compare alternative policies were,"
she argued, "contrary to the systematic and methodological pretensions of the exercise,
intuitive, insofar as policy was being judged desirable or undesirable without any
explanation as to the basis for such evaluations."88 Reviewers were shocked by the
absence of evidence supporting his controversial assumptions. Aaron Flesicher, Professor
of Urban Planning at MIT, argued that Urban Dynamics "neither records nor cities one
datum in support of the qualities of the interactions attributed to the components.
Purveying no such evidence, it can lay no claim to history past or future."" He added
that, "Urban Dynamics is, in its present state, entirely groundless."90 In another review,
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Technology and Culture 11 (January 1970): 109-111; Allan G. Feldt, review of Urban Dynamics, by Jay
W. Forrester, American Sociological Review 35 (April 1970): 364-365; Eugene E. Kaczka, review of
Urban Dynamics, by Jay W. Forrester, Administrative Science Quarterly 15 (June 1970): 262-264; Edgar
S. Dunn, Jr., review of Urban Dynamics, by Jay W. Forrester, Urban Studies 7 (June 1970): 215-217;
Bruce E. Newling, review of Urban Dynamics, by Jay W. Forrester, Geographical Review 60 (July 1970):
455-457; Herbert Weinblatt, "Urban Dynamics: A Critical Examination," review of Urban Dynamics, by
Jay W. Forrester, Policy Sciences 1 (Autumn 1970): 377-383; Harold T. Moody, "Urban Dynamics: A
Review of Forrester's Model of an Urban Area," review of Urban Dynamics, by Jay W. Forrester,
Economic Geography 46 (October 1970): 620-626; Brian J. L. Berry, review of Urban Dynamics, by Jay
W. Forrester, The Journal of Business 43 (October 1970): 487-489; R. T. M. Whipple, review of Urban
Dynamics, by Jay W. Forrester, Australian Geographer 11 (March 1971): 539-540; Philip Bartow and
Thomas A. Reiner, review of Urban Dynamics, by Jay W. Forrester, Economic Geography 49 (July 1973):
275-280; Jerome Rothenberg, "Problems in the Modeling of Urban Development," review of Urban
Dynamics, by Jay W. Forrester, Journal of Urban Economics 1 (1974): 1-20.
" Ida R. Hoos, Systems Analysis in Public Policy: A Critique (Berkley: University of California Press,
1972), 236.
89 Aaron Fleischer, review of Urban Dynamics, by Jay W. Forrester, Journal of the American Institute of
Planners 37 (1971): 54.
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Forrester was ironically compared to Howard Scott, one of the founders of the
Technocracy movement in the 1930s.91 In a less hostile review, it was noted that his
research recalled "an early scientific treatise on chemistry or physics," such as Robert
Boyle's inquiry into the properties of gases in the late seventeenth century.92 For another,
it carried "the ordinary systems analytic hunger for the general to a point of virtually
Baroque splendor."93
Opposition to Urban Dynamics arose even within the USL, where Forrester's
ideas met fierce resistance. In a report entitled "Systems Models of Urban Development,"
James Hester, Jr. set out to study "the role of formal analytic models of urban growth in
understanding the processes of urban growth, stagnation and decay in an environment of
rapid technological change in production, transportation and communication." 94 Hester
argued that the results of his own research "invalidate the specific policy conclusions
reached by Forrester." 95 Not everyone criticized Urban Dynamics, however. Forrester's
stress on the inability of any individual to really understand urban phenomenon with any
certainty because of its complexity proved to be of interest to those who sought to refute
the legitimacy of the social policies of the Great Society. 96 The refutation of the Great
Society was based on a series of social scientific analyses alleging to demonstrate the
failures of its social policy, such as Forrester's. The exaggerated expectations of the
91 Harvey Sinunons, "Systems Dynamics and Technocracy," review of Urban Dynamics, by Jay W.
Forrester, Futures 5 (April, 1973): 212-228.
92 Alexander H. Christake, review of Urban Dynamics, by Jay W. Forrester, Technological Forecasting 1
(Spring, 1970): 427-432.
* David Berlinski, "Systems Analysis," review of Urban Dynamics, by Jay W. Forrester, Urban Affairs
Quarterly 7 (September 1970): 117.
94 James Hester, Jr., Systems Models of Urban Development (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1969), 3.
' Ibid., 5.
9 Carol A. Horton, Race and the Making ofAmerican Liberalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005),
191-222.
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Great Society led to exaggerated assertions of its failure. 97 In these quarters, Urban
Dynamics was celebrated.
Neoconservative Urbanism
"I have been reading Urban Dynamics with the utmost interest," Daniel P. Moynihan
remarked to Forrester in a letter dated February 14, 1969.98 "You really have done
something exceedingly important," he wrote, and added that, "I wonder if there would be
any chance of your coming down to talk with our staff on your findings and what the
Federal government might do in response."99 After Moynihan read Urban Dynamics, he
circulated it throughout the Nixon White House. Moynihan, the former director of the
Joint Center for Urban Studies at MIT and Harvard, was at the time President Richard M.
Nixon's Special Assistant for Urban Affairs and the chair of the Urban Affairs Council
(UAC). Nixon's first act as President of the United States was the establishment of the
UAC on January 23, 1969, which was supposed to be the domestic policy equivalent of
the National Security Council in foreign affairs. At the helm of the UAC, Moynihan
helped the Nixon administration pursue a policy of repressing, infiltrating, and disrupting
militant political organizations that Nixon believed to be personally responsible for the
urban crisis, as if it had been the work of an organized political conspiracy, an idea that
97 Albert 0. Hirschman, The Rhetoric of Reaction: Perversity, Futility, Jeopardy (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1991), 33.
98 "Letter from Daniel P. Moynihan to Jay W. Forrester, February 14, 1969," Moynihan - Washington,
Mar. 20, 1969, Jay W. Forrester Papers, MC-439, Box 17, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Institute
Archives and Special Collections, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
99 Ibid.
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had been discredited by the Kemer Commission's report of 1968.100 In a speech given on
October 22, 1969 at the symposium, "The Engineer and the City," sponsored by the
National Academy of Engineering, Moynihan referred to the significance of Forrester's
research as follows: "Cities are complex social systems... Most federal urban problems
have assumed fairly simple cause-and-effect relationships that do not exist in the complex
real world. Moreover, they have typically been based on "common sense" rather than
research in an area where common sense can be notoriously misleading."10 It appears
that what interested Moynihan was not how Forrester reached his conclusions, but the
conclusions themselves. The Nixon administration was desperately looking for ways to
undermine the legitimacy of the Great Society. Perhaps Moynihan was also attached to
Forrester's research because of the controversy that it caused. Moynihan was not a
stranger to controversy.
He had raised a considerable stir himself in 1965 when, while serving as assistant
secretary of labor in the Kennedy administration, he produced a report concluding that
African American families were trapped in a "tangle of pathology."1 02 Two years later, he
published a scathing critique of the Community Action Program, an important component
of the War on Poverty.103 Like Forrester, Moynihan came to believe that government
social programs were incapable of revitalizing the city, and eagerly joined the Nixon
10Michael W. Flamm, Law and Order: Street Crime, Civil Unrest, and The Crisis of Liberalism in the
1960s (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 15-36.
'01 Daniel Patrick Moynihan, "Toward a National Urban Policy," in The Engineer and the City
(Washington: National Academy of Engineering, 1969), 12.
10 2 Daniel Patrick Moynihan, The Negro Family: The Case for National Action, reprinted in Lee Rainwater
and William L. Yancey, The Moynihan Report and the Politics of Controversy (Cambridge: MIT Press,
1967).
' Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding: Community Action in the War on
Poverty (New York: Free Press, 1969).
44
administration when he was offered a position. 104 Forrester and Moynihan clearly
sympathized with the direction of the new administration. Citing the continued
deterioration and violence in American cities, Nixon argued in 1969 that "a third of a
century of social experimentation has left us a legacy of entrenched programs that have
outlived their time or outgrown their purposes. "10 5
The Pathology of Urban America
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Moynihan was part of a group of former liberal
intellectuals who played an unduly large role in redefining the discourse of the urban
crisis. Urban America came to symbolize all that was wrong, not only with the Great
Society, but also more broadly with New Deal liberalism itself. They argued that the
expansion of the welfare state from the 1930s to the 1960s generated social conflict by
fostering too much democratic participation. In this sense, they argued, social conflict
erupted because the expansion of the social welfare state led sectors of the population to
make demands on the state and to expect more than the state could provide.
Therefore, to limit social conflict, they called for cutting back social programs. In
particular, they came to argue for what the sociologist Nathan Glazer, influenced by
Forrester, called the "limits of social policy." This idea implied that no matter how the
state tried to tackle the social problems of urban America, there was very little such state
10 On Moynihan, see Godfrey Hodgson, The Gentleman from New York: Daniel Patrick Moynihan: A
Biography (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2000).
105 Richard M. Nixon, "Address to the Nation on Domestic Programs, August 8, 1969," Public Papers of
the Presidents, Richard Nixon, 1969, Vol. 1 (Washington: United States Government Printing Office,
1969), 637-638.
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interventions could do to address the problems of inequality in American society. 06 Like
Forrester, Edward C. Banfield in The Unheavenly City explained that "urban decay" was
merely part of an evolutionary process that he referred to as "the logic of metropolitan
growth."107 In short, Banfield's The Unheavenly City, like Forrester's Urban Dynamics,
provided the justification for the abandonment of urban America to the forces of the
market.108 The social policy implications of their interpretation of the urban crisis were
clear: comprehensive social policies were to be systematically disempowered and
dismantled at the local, state, and national scale.
The Social Policy of Urban Decay
Despite plenty of evidence to the contrary, on March 4, 1973, President Nixon declared
that the urban crisis was over. This was clearly a political strategy to remove the
problems of urban America simultaneously from the sphere of the activity of the state and
the sphere of debate. In relation to the recession that began this year, this decision only
deepened the urban crisis. The emergence of the most severe economic recession since
the Great Depression catalyzed a further retrenchment of the state from urban America. It
was widely acknowledged that the long period of economic expansion that the United
States had enjoyed in the aftermath of World War II, due in no small part to the processes
of suburbanization, was beginning to come to a halt. These economic difficulties
10 Nathan Glazer, "The Limits of Social Policy," Commentary 53 (September 1971): 51-58.
1 07 Banfield, Edward C. The Unheavenly City (Boston: Little Brown, 1970).
108 Harvey Averch and Robert A. Levine, "Two Models of the Urban Crisis: An Analytical Essay on
Banfield and Forrester," Policy Sciences 2 (June, 1971): 143-158; Allan Schick, "Five Theories in Search
of an Urban Crisis," Public Administration Review 32 (September 1972): 546-52.
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strengthened the neoconservative agenda, and in the mid 1970s, they successfully remove
the state from active involvement in the implementation of comprehensive social policy
targeting cities, signaling the end of the effort to involve the state in the systematic social
reorganization of urban America. The processes of the postwar period were intensified,
and deindustrialization, disinvestment, and depopulation continued to erode urban
America for the rest of the decade.
In 1974, the USL was closed for lack of funding. As the urban crisis left the stage
of national political debate as the most critical issue of American society, money for the
production of urban expertise also ran dry. In an article published in The Tech on May 17,
1974, Charles L. Miller was quoted as saying that in 1968, when the USL was founded,
"there was the anticipation that urban problems would be approached on the basis of
large scale, mission-oriented projects, as in the space program." "These large scale
projects never came about because of funding limitations," he explained, because "HUD
never became the research equivalent of the Defense Department."10 9 This was a striking
admission, for it indicated the degree to which the vision of the USL as laboratory for a
new urban expertise was in fact dependent upon a larger vision of what the Great Society
might have been. This was not the only reason that the search for expertise at the USL
had come to an end, however. The idea that the development of expertise would be
enough to solve the problems of urban America had become suspect even to those like
Miller who had been committed to it. "There is room for the expert," Miller admitted,
"but these are not the kinds of problems that will be solved by the experts." 0 Indeed, the
attempt to domesticate urban problems by treating them as specialized, even technical,
109 Greg Saltzman, "Urban Systems Lab: Social Work Since '68," The Tech, May 17, 1974, 3.
" Ibid.
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phenomena to be handled by experts had been overwhelmed by the sheer scale of urban
turmoil.
48
Appendix:
Figure 1: Building 39 under construction, location of MIT Computation Center and the
Information Processing Services Center, 1967. Courtesy MIT Museum.
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Figure 2: Building 39 under construction, location of MIT Computation Center and
Information Processing Services Center, 1967. Courtesy MIT Museum.
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Figure 3: Building 39 under construction, location of MIT Computation Center and the
Information Processing Services Center, 1967. Courtesy MIT Museum.
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Figure 4: Building 39 under construction, location of MIT Computation Center and the
Information Processing Services Center, 1968. Courtesy MIT Museum.
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Figure 5: Building 39 under construction, location of MIT Computation Center and the
Information Processing Services Center, 1968. Courtesy MIT Museum.
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Figure 6: Building 39 under construction, location of MIT Computation Center and the
Information Processing Services Center, 1968. Courtesy MIT Museum.
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Figure 7: Building 39 under construction, location of MIT Computation Center and the
Information Processing Services Center, 1968. Courtesy MIT Museum.
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Figure 8: Building 39, location of MIT Computation Center and the Information
Processing Services Center, 1968. Courtesy MIT Museum.
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Figure 9: Installation of IBM 360/System, Model 67, MIT Information Processing
Services Center, 1968. Courtesy MIT Museum.
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Figure 10: Installation of IBM 360/System, Model 67, MIT Information Processing
Services Center, 1968. Courtesy MIT Museum.
58
Figure 11: IBM 360/System, Model 67, MIT Information Processing Services Center,
1968. Courtesy MIT Museum.
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Figure 12: IBM 360/System, Model 67, MIT Information Processing Services Center,
1968. Courtesy MIT Museum.
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Figure 13: IBM 360/System, Model 67, MIT Information Processing Services Center,
1968. Courtesy MIT Museum.
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Figure 14: Jay W. Forrester, 1968. Courtesy MIT Museum.
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Figure 15: Diagrammatic elements generated from the computer program DYNAMO,
from Jay W. Forrester, Industrial Dynamics (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1961), 7-11.
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Figure 16: Diagram of "Organization of Production-Distribution System,"
from Jay W. Forrester, Industrial Dynamics (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1961), 22.
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Figure 17: Diagram of "Muhtiloop Decision-Making System,"
from Jay W. Forrester, Industrial Dynamics (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1961), 24.
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Figure 18: Diagram of "Corporate Decision-Making System,"
from Jay W. Forrester, Industrial Dynamics (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1961), 224.
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Figure 18: John F. Collins, 1968. Courtesy of MIT Museum.
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Figure 19: Model of the Govemment Center, Boston, 1968.
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Figure 20: Diagram of the "urban area in limitless environment," from Jay W. Forrester,
Urban Dynamics (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1969), 15.
Dyname behavior
Setatd within the
bomunay. Charcterstic
modes of behavior crated
by interacion within the boundary.
Figure 21: Diagram of the "closed social system" of the city, from Jay W. Forrester,
Urban Dynamics (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1969), 15.
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Figure 22: Diagram of the nine "state variables," from Jay W. Forrester, Urban Dynamics
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1969), 16.
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Figure 23: Diagram of the "Underemployed sector," from Jay W. Forrester, Urban
Dynamics (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1969), 40.
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Figure 24: Diagram of "Development Programs," from Jay W. Forrester, Urban
Dynamics (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1969), 212.
70
/ Mi )34 APt TICO %
6AV IV %i
LD 01 .12
'LtP 19. L)
Laof mi Wr -
Flow, A-* New-merpeii mtuw.
Figure 25: Diagram of the "New-enterprise sector," from Jay W. Forrester, Urban
Dynamics (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1969), 190.
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Figure 26: Diagram Of the "Premium-housing sector," from Jay W. Forrester, Urban
Dynamics (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1969), 171.
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Figure 27: Plotted graph showing the behavior of the urban system over a 250 year
period, from Jay W. Forrester, Urban Dynamics (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1969), 40.
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Figure 28: Plotted graph showing the behavior of the urban system over a 250 year
period, from Jay W. Forrester, Urban Dynamics (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1969), 41.
74
A
414
V
14
47
is
/ ae
cat
Figure 29: Plotted graph showing the behavior of the urban system over a 250 year
period, from Jay W. Forrester, Urban Dynamics (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1969), 108.
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